We present a Consensus algorithm that combines randomization and unreliable failure detection, two well-known techniques for solving Consensus in asynchronous systems with crash failures. This hybrid algorithm combines advantages from both approaches: it guarantees deterministic termination if the failure detector is accurate, and probabilistic termination otherwise. In executions with no failures or failure detector mistakes, the most likely ones in practice, Consensus is reached in only two asynchronous rounds.
Background
It is well-known that Consensus cannot be solved in asynchronous systems with failures, even if communication is reliable, at most one process may fail, and it can only fail by crashing. This \impossibility of Consensus", shown in a seminal paper by Fischer, Lynch and Paterson FLP85] , has been the subject of intense research seeking to \circumvent" this negative result (e.g., Ben83, BT83, Rab83, DDS87, DLS88, CT96, CHT96]).
We focus on two of the major techniques to circumvent the impossibility of Consensus in asynchronous systems: randomization and unreliable failure detection. The rst one assumes that each process has an oracle (denoted R-oracle) that provides random bits Ben83] . The second technique assumes that each process has an oracle (denoted FD-oracle) that provides a list of processes suspected to have crashed CT96] . Each approach has some advantages over the other, and we seek to combine advantages from both.
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With a randomized Consensus algorithm, every process can query its R-oracle, and use the oracle's random bit to determine its next step. With such an algorithm, termination is achieved with probability 1, within a nite expected number of steps (for a survey of randomized Consensus algorithms see CD89] ).
With a failure-detector based Consensus algorithm, every process can query its local FDoracle (which provides a list of processes that are suspected to have crashed) to determine the process's next step. Consensus can be solved with FD-oracles that make an in nite number of mistakes. In particular, Consensus can be solved with any FD-oracle that satis es two properties, strong completeness and eventual weak accuracy. Roughly speaking, the rst property states that every process that crashes is eventually suspected by every correct process, and the second one states that some correct process is eventually not suspected. These properties de ne the weakest class of failure detectors that can be used to solve Consensus CHT96] .
In this paper we describe a hybrid Consensus algorithm with the following properties. Every process has access to both an R-oracle and an FD-oracle. If the FD-oracle satis es the above two properties, the algorithm solves Consensus (no matter how the R-oracle behaves). If the FD-oracle loses its accuracy property, but the R-oracle works, the algorithm still solves Consensus, albeit \only" with probability 1. In executions with no failures or failure detector mistakes, the most likely ones in practice, the algorithm reaches Consensus in two asynchronous rounds. A discussion of the relative merits of randomization, failure detection, and this hybrid approach is postponed to Section 7.
The idea of combining randomization and failure detection to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems rst appeared in DM94]. A related idea, namely, combining randomization and deterministic algorithms to solve Consensus in synchronous systems was explored in GP90, Zam96] . A brief comparison with our results is given in Section 8.
Informal Model
Our model of asynchronous computation is patterned after the one in FLP85], and its extension in CHT96]. We only sketch its main features here. We consider asynchronous distributed systems in which there is no bound on message delay, clock drift, or the time necessary to execute a step. To simplify the presentation of our model, we assume the existence of a discrete global clock. This is merely a ctional device: the processes do not have access to it. We take the range T of the clock's ticks to be the set of natural numbers N.
The system consists of a set of n processes, = fp 0 ; p 1 ; : : : ; p n?1 g. Every pair of processes is connected by a reliable communication channel. Up to f processes can fail by crashing.
A failure pattern indicates which processes crash, and when, during an execution. Formally, a failure pattern F is a function from N to 2 , where F(t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. Once a process crashes, it does not \recover", i.e., 8t :
F(t) F(t + 1). We de ne crashed(F) = S t2N F(t) and correct(F) = ? crashed(F). If p 2 crashed(F) we say p crashes (in F) and if p 2 correct(F) we say p is correct (in F).
Each process has access to two oracles: a failure detector, henceforth denoted the FDoracle, and a random number generator, henceforth denoted the R-oracle. When a process queries its FD-oracle, it obtains a list of processes. When it queries its R-oracle it obtains a bit. The properties of these oracles are described in the two next sections.
A distributed algorithm A is a collection of n deterministic automata (one for each process in the system) that communicate by sending messages through reliable channels.
The execution of A occurs in steps as follows. For every time t 2 T , at most one process takes a step. Each step consists of receiving a message; querying the FD-oracle; querying the R-oracle; changing state; and optionally sending a message to one process. We assume that messages are never lost. That is, if a process does not crash, it eventually receives every message sent to it.
A schedule is a sequence fs j g j2N of processes and a sequence ft j g j2N of strictly increasing times. A schedule indicates which processes take a step and when: for each j, process s j takes a step at time t j . A schedule is consistent (with respect to a failure pattern F) if a process does not take a step after it has crashed (in F). A schedule is fair (with respect to a failure pattern F) if each process that is correct (in F) takes an in nite number of steps.
We consider only schedules that are consistent and fair.
FD-oracles
Every process p has access to a local FD-oracle module that outputs a list of processes that are suspected to have crashed. If some process q belongs to such list, we say that p suspects q. 1 FD-oracles can make mistakes: it is possible for a process p to be suspected by another even though p did not crash, or for a process to crash and never be suspected.
FD-oracles can be classi ed according to properties that limit the extent of such mistakes. We focus on one of the eight classes of FD-oracles de ned in CT96], namely, the class of It is known that 3S is the weakest class of FD-oracles that can be used to solve Consensus.
R-oracles
Each process has access to a local R-oracle module that outputs one bit each time it is queried. We say that the R-oracle is random if it outputs an independent random bit for each query. For simplicity, we assume a uniform distribution, i.e., a random R-oracle outputs 0 and 1, each with probability 1=2.
Adversary Power
When designing fault-tolerant algorithms, we often assume that an intelligent adversary has some control on the behavior of the system, e.g., the adversary may be able to control the occurrence and the timing of process failures, the message delays, and the scheduling of processes. Adversaries may have limitations on their computing power and on the information that they can obtain from the system. Di erent algorithms are designed to defeat di erent types of adversaries CD89].
We now describe the adversary that our hybrid algorithm defeats. The adversary has unbounded computational power, and full knowledge of all process steps that already occurred. In particular, it knows the contents of all past messages, the internal state of all processes in the system, 2 and all the previous outputs of both the R-oracle and FD-oracle. With this information, at any time in the execution, the adversary can dynamically select which process takes the next step, which message this process receives (if any), and which processes (if any) crash. The adversary, however, operates under the following restrictions: the nal schedule must be consistent and fair, every message sent to a correct process must be eventually received, and at most f processes may crash over the entire execution.
In addition to the above power, we allow the adversary to initially select one of the two oracles to control, and possibly corrupt. 3 If the adversary selects to control the R-oracle, it can predict and even determine the bits output by that oracle. For example, the adversary can force some local R-oracle module to always output 0, or it can dynamically adjust the R-oracle's output according to what the processes have done so far.
If the adversary selects to control the FD-oracle, it can ensure that the FD-oracle does not satisfy eventual weak accuracy. In other words, at any time the adversary can include any process (whether correct or not) in the output of the local FD-oracle module of any process. The adversary, however, does not have the power to disrupt the strong completeness property of the FD-oracle. This is not a limitation in practice: most failure detectors are based on time-outs and eventually detect all process crashes.
If the adversary does not control the R-oracle then the R-oracle is random. If the adversary does not control the FD-oracle then the FD-oracle is in 3S. We stress that the algorithm does not know which one of the two oracles (FD-oracle or R-oracle) is controlled by the adversary.
The Consensus Problem
Uniform Binary Consensus is de ned in terms of two primitives, propose(v) and decide(v), where v 2 f0; 1g. When a process executes propose(v), we say that it proposes v; similarly, when a process executes decide(v), we say that it decides v. The Uniform Binary Consensus problem is speci ed as follows: Termination: Every correct process eventually decides some value.
For probabilistic Consensus algorithms, Termination is weakened to
Termination with probability 1: With probability 1, every correct process eventually decides some value.
Hybrid Consensus Algorithm
The hybrid Consensus algorithm shown in Figure 1 combines Ben-Or's algorithm Ben83] with failure-detection and the rotating coordinator paradigm used in CT96]. With this paradigm, we assume that all processes have a priori knowledge that during phase k, one selected process, namely p k mod n , is the coordinator. The algorithm works under the assumption that a majority of processes are correct (i.e., n > 2f). It is easy to see that this requirement is necessary for any algorithm that solves Consensus in asynchronous systems with crash failures, even if all processes have access to a random R-oracle and an FD-oracle that belongs to 3S.
In the hybrid algorithm, every message contains a tag (R, P, S or E), a phase number, and a value which is either 0 or 1 (for messages tagged P or S, it could also be \?"). Messages tagged R are called reports; those tagged with P are called proposals; those with tag S are called suggestions to the coordinator]; those with tag E are called estimates from the coordinator]. When p sends (R; k; v), (P; k; v) or (S; k; v) we say that p reports, proposes or suggests v in phase k, respectively. When the coordinator sends (E; k; v) we say that the coordinator sends estimate v in phase k.
Each execution of the while loop is called a phase, and each phase consists of four asynchronous rounds. In the rst round, processes report to each other their current estimate (0 or 1) for a decision value.
In the second round, if a process receives a majority of reports for the same value then it proposes that value to all processes, otherwise it proposes \?". Note that it is impossible for one process to propose 0 and another process to propose 1. At the end of the second round, if a process receives f + 1 proposals for the same value di erent than ?, then it decides that value. If it receives at least one value di erent than ?, then it adopts that value as its new estimate, otherwise it adopts ? for estimate.
In the third round, processes suggest their estimate to the current coordinator. If the coordinator receives a value di erent than ? then it sends that value as its estimate. Otherwise, the coordinator queries the R-oracle, and sends the random value that it obtains as its estimate.
In the fourth round, processes wait until they receive the coordinator's estimate or until their FD-oracle suspects the coordinator. If a process receives the coordinator's estimate, it To simplify the presentation, the algorithm in Figure 1 does not include a halt statement. Moreover, once a correct process decides a value, it will keep deciding the same value in all subsequent phases. However, it is easy to modify the algorithm so that every process decides at most once, and halts at most one round after deciding.
Proof of Correctness
The hybrid algorithm shown in Figure 1 always satis es the safety properties of Consensus. This holds no matter how the FD-oracle or the R-oracle behave, that is, even if these oracles are totally under the control of the adversary. On the other hand, the algorithm satis es liveness properties only if the FD-oracle satis es strong completeness. Strong completeness is easy to achieve in practice: most failure-detectors use time-out mechanisms, and every process that crashes eventually causes a time-out, and therefore a permanent suspicion.
Assume that there is a majority of correct processes (i.e., n > 2f). We show the following:
Theorem 1 (Safety) The hybrid algorithm always satis es validity and uniform agreement. (Liveness) Suppose that the FD-oracle satis es strong completeness.
If the FD-oracle satis es eventual weak accuracy, i.e., it is in 3S, then the algorithm satis es termination. If the R-oracle is random then the algorithm satis es termination with probability 1.
Proof: We say that process p starts phase k if process p completes at least k ? 1 iterations of the while loop. We say that process p reaches line n in phase k if process p starts phase k and p executes past line n ? 1 in that phase. We say that v is k-locked if every process that starts phase k does so with its variable x set to v. When ambiguities may arise, a local variable of a process p is subscripted by p, e.g., x p is the local variable x of process p.
We rst show the safety properties.
Lemma 1 Suppose k > 0. Then (1) it is impossible for a process to propose 0 and another one to propose 1 in the same phase k; and (2) it is impossible for a process to suggest 0 and another to suggest 1 in the same phase k.
Proof: We prove (1) by contradiction: suppose that two processes p and q propose 0 and 1, respectively, in phase k. Thus, p received more than n=2 reports for 0 and q received more than n=2 reports for 1 in phase k. But then there is a process that reports 0 to p and 1 to q in phase k, and this is impossible. This proves (1). Proof: Suppose v is k-locked for some k > 0. Then, all reports sent in line 6 of phase k are for v. Since n ? f > n=2, every process that proposes some value in phase k proposes v in line 9. Consider a process p that reaches line 13 in phase k. Clearly, p receives n ? f From now on we assume that the FD-oracle satis es strong completeness, and proceed to prove the liveness properties.
Lemma 4 Every correct process starts every phase k > 0. Proof: The detailed proof is by a simple but tedious induction on k. We describe only the central idea here. In each phase, there are four wait statements that can potentially block processes (lines 7, 11, 16, 22). It is not possible for a correct process to be blocked forever in any of the rst three wait statements, because at least n ? f processes are correct and send the messages that this process is waiting for. Consider the fourth wait statement. Either the coordinator c sends its estimate to all processes or c crashes. In the rst case, every correct process receives this estimate. In the second case, c eventually appears on the list of suspects, i.e., c 2 FD-oracle (because the FD-oracle satis es strong completeness). So no correct process waits forever at the fourth wait statement of a phase. Proof: By eventual weak accuracy of the FD-oracle, there exists a time after which a correct process p m is never suspected by anyone. For each process p i , let k i be the value of variable k of process p i at that time. Let k = 1+max i fk i g andk = minfj + k : j 2 N^(j + k) mod n = mg.
Let q and r be arbitrary processes that start phasek + 1. In phasek, the coordinator is process p m , by choice ofk. So q and r do not suspect the coordinator and thus q and r set x q and x r to the coordinator's estimate in line 24. Since this estimate is di erent from ? and unique for phasek, we have x q = x r = v for some v 6 = ? at the beginning of phasek + 1. So v isk + 1-locked. Therefore, by Corollary 4, all correct processes decide v in phasek + 1. 2
We now proceed to show that if the R-oracle is random, then the algorithm satis es termination with probability 1. For k > 0, let k be the rst time that any process receives n ? f proposals in phase k. From Lemma 4, for every k > 0, some process receives n ? f proposals in phase k, and so k is well-de ned. Note that in our algorithm no process queries the R-oracle in phase k before time k .
For each k > 0, we say that a value v is k-major at time t if by time t more than n=2 processes have started phase k with their variable x set to v. Clearly, for each k > 0 and all times t and t 0 , it is impossible for 0 to be k-major at t, and 1 to be k-major at t 0 .
We Lemma 7 If the R-oracle is random then the probability that some epoch is lucky is 1. Proof: The result is immediate from the following observation: for every r 1, (a) the probability that epoch r is lucky is at least 2 ?(2n+2) (because in each phase there are at most 5 Phase 1 is not part of any epoch.
n+1 queries to the R-oracle, and the R-oracle is random), and (b) for any r 0 6 = r, the events \epoch r is lucky" and \epoch r 0 is lucky" are independent (because epochs r and r 0 consist of disjoint sets of phases).2
Lemma 8 For every r 1, if epoch r is lucky then some value is (2r + 1)-locked or (2r + 2)-locked.
Proof: Throughout the proof of this lemma, x some arbitrary r 1 and assume that epoch r is lucky. Let k = 2r; recall that epoch r consists of phases k and k + 1. Since epoch r is lucky, if any process R-gets a value v at time t and in phase j = k or j = k + 1, then v = FavorableToss(r; u) for some time u, j u t (value v was obtained either directly from the R-oracle or indirectly through the coordinator).
Case 1: Suppose some value v is k-major at time k . By the de nition of FavorableToss, for any u such that k u, FavorableToss(r; u) = v. So, if a process R-gets a value in phase k, that value is v. Note that v is not k-major at any time. By Lemma 6, v is
Case 2: Now assume that no value is k-major at time k . Case 2.1: Suppose that no value is k-major before time k+1 . Then for any u, k u, we have FavorableToss(r; u) = 0. By Lemma 6, every process p that starts phase k + 1 before time k+1 does so with x p set to some value that p R-got in phase k, and such value can only be 0. So all reports (and thus all proposals) sent in phase k + 1 before time k+1 are for 0. From the de nition of k+1 , there are at least n ? f such proposals for 0 in phase k +1. By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 2, value 0 is (k + 2)-locked.
Case 2.2: Now assume some value v is k-major before time k+1 . Case 2.2.1: Suppose v = 0. Since 1 is never k-major, then for any time u such that k u, we have FavorableToss(r; u) = 0. So all processes that R-get a value in phase k R-get 0.
By Lemma 6, value 0 is (k + 1)-locked.
Case 2.2.2: Now assume v = 1. For any time u, k u < k+1 , we have FavorableToss(r; u) = 0. Let S be the processes that R-get a value in phase k before time k+1 ; clearly, all processes in S R-get 0.
Case 2.2.2.1: Suppose jSj n=2. Then for any time u, k u, FavorableToss(r; u) = 0. So, all processes that R-get in phase k + 1 R-get 0. Note that jSj n=2 implies that 1 can never be (k + 1)-major. By Lemma 6, value 0 is (k + 2)-locked.
Case 2.2.2.2: Now assume that jSj < n=2.
Case 2.2.2.2.1: Suppose that the coordinator of phase k does not query the R-oracle in line 20 of phase k before time k+1 . Then for any u such that k+1 u, we have FavorableToss(r; u) = 1. So, if the coordinator queries the R-oracle in line 20 of phase k it obtains 1 from the R-oracle. Therefore, all processes that R-get a value at or after time k+1 in phase k R-get 1. Thus, exactly jSj < n=2 processes R-get 0 in phase k. Since 1 is k-major, from Lemma 6 we conclude that value 0 can never be (k + 1)-major. Since no process queries the R-oracle in phase k + 1 before time k+1 , all processes that R-get a value in phase k + 1 R-get 1. By Lemma 6, value 1 is (k + 2)-locked. Note that if any such process starts phase k + 1, then it R-gets a value in phase k, and that value is 0, and thus such process starts phase k + 1 with its variable x set to 0. Therefore at most n ? (n ? f) = f < n=2 processes start phase k+1 with their variable x set to 1. So 1 can never be (k+1)-major. All processes that R-get in phase k + 1 R-get 0. By Lemma 6, value 0 is (k + 2)-locked.2
Lemma 9 (Termination with probability 1) If the R-oracle is random then the probability that all correct processes decide is 1.
Proof: Immediate from Lemmata 7 and 8, and Corollary 4.2
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete: validity and uniform agreement were shown in Corollary 3 and Corollary 2, respectively. Termination was proved in Lemma 5, and termination with probability 1 was shown in Lemma 9.
Theorem 1
From the proof of Lemma 7, it is easy to see that the expected number of rounds for termination is O(2 2n ). However, it can be shown that, as in Ben83], termination is reached in constant expected number of rounds if f = O( p n). In Section 7, we outline a similar hybrid algorithm that terminates in constant expected number of rounds even for f = O(n).
An Optimization
The algorithm in Figure 1 was designed to be simple rather than e cient, because our main goal here is to demonstrate the viability of a \robust" hybrid approach (one in which termination can occur in more than one way: by \good" failure detection or by \good" random draws). The following optimization suggests that such hybrid algorithms can also be e cient in practice. In many systems, failures are rare, and failure detectors can be tuned to seldom make mistakes (i.e., erroneous suspicions). The algorithm in Figure 1 can be optimized to perform particularly well in such systems. The optimized version ensures that all correct processes decide by the end of two asynchronous rounds when the rst coordinator does not crash and no process erroneously suspects it. 6 6 Actually, decision occurs in two rounds even if up to n ? 2f ? 1 processes erroneously suspect it. c p 0 fp 0 is the rst coordinatorg if p = c then send (E; 0; v p ) to all processes fif p is the rst coordinatorg wait until receive (E; 0; v coord) from c or c 2FD-oracle fquery FD-oracleg if received (E; 0; v coord) then send (P; 0; v coord) to all processes else send (P; 0; ?) to all processes wait for messages of the form (P; 0; ) from n ? f processes f\ " can be 0, 1 or ?g if received at least f + 1 (P; 0; v) with the same v 6 = ? then decide (v) if received at least one (P; 0; v) with v 6 = ? then x v 
Discussion
In practice, many systems are well-behaved most of the time: few failures actually occur, and most messages are received within some predictable time. Failure-detector based algorithms (whether \pure" ones like in CT96] or hybrid ones like in this paper) are particularly wellsuited to take advantage of this: (time-out based) failure detectors can be tuned so that the algorithms perform optimally when the system behaves as predicted, and performance degrades gracefully as the system deviates from its \normal" behavior (i.e., if failures occur or messages take longer than expected). For example, the optimized version of our hybrid algorithm solves Consensus in only two asynchronous rounds in the executions that are most likely to occur in practice, namely, runs with no failures or erroneous suspicions.
The above discussion suggests that using this hybrid approach is better than using the randomized approach alone. In fact, randomized Consensus algorithms for asynchronous systems tend to be ine cient in practical settings. 7 Typically, their performance depends more on \luck" (e.g., many processes happen to start with the same initial value or happen to draw the same random bit) than on how \well-behaved" the underlying system is (e.g., on the number of failures that actually occur during execution). The fact that randomized algorithms are extremely \robust", i.e., they do not depend on how the system behaves, may also be an inherent source of ine ciency.
Note that our hybrid algorithm terminates with probability 1 even if the FD-oracle is completely inaccurate (in fact even if every process suspects every other process all the time). So it is more robust than algorithms that are simply failure-detector based.
An important remark is now in order about the expected termination time of our hybrid algorithm. We developed this algorithm by combining Ben-Or's randomized algorithm Ben83] with the failure detection ideas in CT96]. We selected Ben-Or's algorithm because it is the simplest, and thus the most appropriate to illustrate this approach, even though its expected number of rounds is exponential in n for f = O(n). By starting from an e cient randomized algorithm, due to Chor et al. CMS89] , we can obtain a hybrid algorithm that terminates in constant expected number of rounds, as we now brie y explain.
Roughly speaking, the randomized asynchronous Consensus algorithm in CMS89] is obtained from Ben-Or's algorithm by replacing each coin toss with the toss of a \weakly global coin" computed by a coin toss procedure. We can do exactly the same: replace the coin tosses of the algorithm in Figure 1 with those obtained by using the coin toss procedure. More precisely, in each phase, every process: (a) invokes this procedure between the second and third rounds (i.e., between lines 13 and 14) to obtain a random bit, and (b) uses this random bit rather than querying the R-oracle (in lines 20 and 25). 8 As in CMS89], this modi ed hybrid algorithm terminates 9 in constant expected number of rounds for f n(3 ? p 5)=2 0:38n. But also as in CMS89], and in contrast to the algorithm in Section 4, it assumes that the adversary cannot see the internal state of processes or the content of messages. With the optimization of Figure 3 , this modi ed hybrid algorithm also terminates in two rounds in failure-free and suspicion-free runs. 7 Algorithms that assume that processes a priori agree on a long sequence of random bits Rab83, Tou84] are more e cient than others. But this assumption may be too strong for some systems. 8 As in CMS89], another simple modi cation is necessary: the addition of a \synchronization round" just before the coin toss procedure. In this round, processes broadcast \wait" messages, then wait until n ? f such messages are received. 9 Provided, of course, that the FD-oracle satis es strong completeness.
Related Work
The idea of combining randomization with a deterministic Consensus algorithm appeared in GP90], and was further developed in Zam96]. These works, however, are for synchronous systems only and do not involve failure detection. Dolev and Malki were the rst to combine randomization and unreliable failure detection to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems with process crashes DM94]. That work di ers from ours in many aspects:
The hybrid algorithms given in DM94] assume that both the R-oracle and the FDoracle always work correctly. If the failure detector loses it accuracy property, processes may decide di erently; if the random source of bits is corrupted, processes may never decide.
Two goals of DM94] are to use failure detection to increase the resiliency and ensure the deterministic termination of randomized Consensus algorithms. The hybrid Consensus algorithms given in DM94] achieve the rst goal, by increasing the resiliency from f < n=2 to f < n, but not the second one. It is stated, however, that a future version of the paper will give an algorithm that achieves both goals.
The two hybrid algorithms in DM94] use failure detectors that are stronger than 3S.
The rst one | which supposes that the same sequence of random bits is shared by all the processes, as in Rab83] | assumes that some correct process is never suspected by any process. The second algorithm | which drops the assumption of a common sequence of bits | assumes that (n) correct processes are never suspected by any process.
